Introduction
In recent years, development studies has seen a surge of interest in the idea that people's preferences may adapt to circumstances of deprivation (Clark 2009; Khader 2009; Khader 2011; Teschl & Comim 2005; Clark et al 2012) . The concept of adaptive preferences, however, is at once extremely useful and deeply problematic.
On the one hand, if persons adaptively endorse circumstances of injustice or deprivation, then their preferences offer, at best, questionable support for those circumstances. The concept of adaptive preferences provides theorists with a way of explaining both why this is so and what ought to be done about it. On the other hand, it may be both controversial and unclear precisely when and why preferences count as adaptive. This is problematic because a theory that improperly discounts a person's preferences as adaptive runs the risk of discounting her capacity as a moral agent as well. Accordingly, with the concept of adaptive preferences comes a serious tension between showing respect for persons as moral agents and developing an important tool for combatting and criticizing injustice.
The recent surge of interest in the literature is due in large part to the central motivating role that the concept of adaptive preferences plays in Martha Nussbaum's influential Capabilities Approach (1992; 2000b , 2003 . 2 Recognizing that deprived persons may resign themselves to inadequate circumstances in order to avoid constant frustration, Nussbaum argues that justice requires focusing on whether persons are able to engage in a specific set of centrally important human functionings, rather than simply asking if they are happy with their circumstances. In other words, she makes central use of the concept of adaptive preferences as a tool for combatting and criticizing injustice. Yet despite the important motivating role that the concept plays in Nussbaum's work, she offers no clear account of it. Instead, as Serene Khader (2011, 19) rightly notes, Nussbaum relies heavily on intuitively compelling examples of preferences that seem to be obviously adaptive. For instance, she motivates her capabilities approach by appealing to conversations that she has had with women in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh who had no access to electricity, teachers, or bus services, but did not think that this was a bad thing, 'that being the only way that they had known' (Nussbaum 2000b, 140) . She similarly appeals to other women who adopt norms according to which they are owed less than their male peers in terms of education, employment, and health care without taking their situation to be unjust (Nussbaum 2006, 269; 1995, 91; 2011a, 54; 2000a) . But Nussbaum does not ever explicitly tell her readers what ties these examples together: she never outlines principled reasons that a preference should count as adaptive.
This paper has two aims. First, I construct the principled account of adaptive preferences immanent in Nussbaum's body of work. Second, I show that when the account is made explicit, it fails to show appropriate respect for persons as moral agents. To illustrate this, I provide a novel distinction between two different kinds of respect owed to persons, which I refer to as primary and secondary recognition respect. My main thesis is that Nussbaum's account of adaptive preferences only succeeds in showing the former. I claim that the concept of adaptive preferences, if it is to be useful in either theory or practice, must be reconsidered in order to show both kinds of respect. Finally, I sketch some suggestions for a respectful account which maintains much of what is best in Nussbaum's theory.
Why focus on Nussbaum's account on adaptive preference?
Nussbaum's account of adaptive preferences is neither the only nor the best available in the literature. Indeed, Serene Khader provides her own rigorous and expansive account of the concept (Khader 2009 (Khader , 2011 , in part in response to Nussbaum's reliance on intuitive but unprincipled examples. 3 Accordingly, the reader might wonder why I bother to extrapolate from Nussbaum's account, rather than engaging with the more explicit accounts already available. I do so for two reasons.
The first has to do with the influence of Nussbaum's capabilities approach, which the concept of adaptive preferences plays a central role in motivating.
Nussbaum does not explicitly tell us what unifies her examples of intuitively adaptive
preferences, but she does rule one possibility out: simple adaptation to limiting circumstances. 4 Nussbaum holds that some kinds of adaptation are positive and to be encouraged, as in the case of the child who avoids a lifetime of frustration by giving up his impossible preference to fly like a bird (2000b, 138) . To distinguish this case from those that she counts as properly adaptive, she writes, we need something elsewe need 'a substantive theory of justice and central goods' that gives us ' There are also important theoretical reasons to focus on Nussbaum. As I said above, a tension exists between showing respect for persons and making the concept of adaptive preferences a socially and politically useful one. As the paper progresses, it will become clear that I take perfectionist accounts of adaptive preferences to be especially vulnerable to this tension. My second reason for focusing on Nussbaum in this paper relates to the transition that Nussbaum's theory undergoes. Although
Nussbaum rejects perfectionism explicitly and completely in her later work (2006; 2011a; 2011b) , the account of human capabilities to which her account of adaptive preferences is tied begins several decades earlier with a perfectionist account of the good and moves only gradually towards political liberalism. Her primary discussion of adaptive preferences occurs in the transitionary period in the late 1990s and early 2000s when her account seems to have both perfectionist and political-liberal commitments. I will argue that her account of adaptive preferences seems, to its detriment, to maintain its perfectionism. The evolution of Nussbaum's justification for the capabilities approach makes her account uniquely suited to show the way in which perfectionist accounts of adaptive preferences fail to show respect for persons. These criticisms, once developed, can then be applied more widely to other more explicitly perfectionist accounts of adaptive preferences, such as Khader's.
Since my argument is built on first developing and then rejecting Nussbaum's account of adaptive preferences, one might worry that I am creating a strawman version of her argument. The aim of this paper, however, is ultimately sympathetic to Nussbaum's broader project of the capabilities approach, which I consider to be important both philosophically and practically. I aim to highlight the main problems with her account of adaptive preferences in order for a better account to be developed.
Since the capabilities approach is centrally motivated by the problem of adaptive preferences, such an account would provide a stronger foundation for Nussbaum's wider project. Unfortunately, due to space constraints, I must leave the project of developing such an account for another paper.
The benefits and drawbacks of a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences 6 Broadly, perfectionist moral theories hold that there is an objective human good at which persons ought to aim (Hurka 1993; Raz 1986; Arneson 2000) . Since a full treatment of perfectionism is beyond the scope of this paper, I will focus on those perfectionist theories that claim that the good life consists in developing to a high degree whichever properties it picks out as those that 'constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity -[that] make humans humans' (Hurka 1993, 3) . The candidates for this role are many, but any perfectionist moral theory must identify some specific good or set of goods that it directs persons to pursue. These goods will count as goods whether or not people actually want to pursue them, since 6 Strictly, the phrase 'a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences' makes little sense, since perfectionism is concerned with human excellences -or at least goods -while adaptive preferences are generally thought of as preferences for things that are neither excellent nor good. Nevertheless, for simplicity's sake, I will often use the phrase 'a perfectionist account of adaptive preferences' to mean 'an account of adaptive preferences defined in terms of a perfectionist account of human good.' perfectionism holds that 'what is good for its own sake for a person is fixed independently of her attitudes and opinions towards it' (Arneson 2000, 38) . And from perfectionist moral theories, it is a short leap to perfectionist political theories that hold that it is the role of the state to pursue and develop these goods, whether or not people endorse them.
Although she prefers the term 'Aristotelian essentialism', Nussbaum's early justification for the capabilities approach is clearly perfectionist in the moral sense.
By 'essentialism,' Nussbaum means 'the view that human life has central defining features ' (1992, 205) , and her view is essentialist in the sense that the capabilities on her list are meant to capture a set of functions that are intimately tied to a particularly Defining adaptive preferences in this perfectionist way is appealing, because it allows us to draw the line between adaptive and nonadaptive preferences in an intuitively plausible way. Any complete account of adaptive preferences will need to give some set of conditions for adaptiveness, and these conditions will require justification. Perfectionism provides that justification. Recall that the capabilities that Nussbaum lists are meant to form the core of the overall shape and content of the human form of life, and that adaptive preferences are preferences taken to be suspect in some way. Preferences that prevent persons from living in essentially human ways seem intuitively to be perfect candidates for such suspicion.
Defining adaptive preferences in this way, however, also has a significant drawback: persons whose conceptions of the good reject the items on the perfectionist list will not be shown the respect granted to those with 'proper' preferences. In the next section, I will distinguish between two especially important kinds of respect, which I call primary and secondary recognition respect. Although Nussbaum is alert to the way in which perfectionism might fail to show what I call primary recognition respect for persons, she at least initially fails to appreciate the way in which perfectionism might fail to show them secondary recognition respect. In her later turn towards political liberalism, she more clearly appreciates the severity of this second kind of disrespect, and modifies the justification for her capabilities approach accordingly. But as I will argue, the vague account of adaptive preferences that she continues to offer can be most plausibly understood to maintain its original perfectionist justification -and accordingly, to maintain the problems that come with perfectionism.
Perfectionism and two kinds of respect
Let us consider the two forms of disrespect at stake. Nussbaum wants the state to adopt a substantive list of the capabilities because she recognizes that some persons will fail to want the items identified. But when such a failure occurs, a commitment to the list could licence two different forms of disrespectful response. In the worst case, it could license intervention into a person's life aimed at coercing her into the human functioning that she fails to prefer for herself. This sort of paternalistic coercion quite clearly violates a commitment to respect for persons as moral agents, since it denies them the ability to act on their conceptions of the good. But even in the best case, where coercive intervention is ruled out, we might still think that defining basic human functioning in this way at the state level fails to show respect for persons by refusing to recognize as valuable those preferences that conflict with the items on the list.
At first glance, these two sorts of disrespect seem to mirror the distinction ' (1977, 38) . While the former is owed to persons by virtue of their personhood, the latter is discretionary. Darwall, however, does not flesh out the content of the consideration or recognition that we owe to all persons, and this must clearly be done if we are to determine whether Nussbaum succeeds in granting it. I propose that we distinguish between at least two different forms of recognition respect (although there may be more Even Nussbaum's early perfectionist account of capabilities can grant this kind of respect. As its name suggests, her capabilities approach makes the provision of capability rather than functioning the aim of public policy. That is, her list is only meant to be one of opportunities that governments must provide and that individuals can choose whether or not to take advantage of, rather than a list of functionings that the government must impose on citizens. In part, this is because the functionings associated with different capabilities will at times conflict with one another: for instance, the capability for practical reason protects the liberty of religious observance, and the person who observes a religion which requires her to engage in strenuous fasting may be unable to simultaneously achieve the functioning of bodily health, which requires adequate nutrition (Nussbaum 2000a, p. 87) . Given this kind of trade-off and the centrality of practical reasoning to her list, Nussbaum recognizes the importance of giving content to the list in a way that does not remove from citizens 'the chance to make their own choices about the good life ' (1992, 225 (Rawls 2005, 56) . Since people have a deep allegiance to their comprehensive doctrines, both Nussbaum and Rawls recognize that their respective 8 A note on terminology: calling this form of recognition respect "secondary" might suggest that it is less important than primary recognition respect. I take no stand on this issue, and note only that some of the major criticisms of adaptive preferences in the literature are more closely tied to secondary recognition respect than to primary (Narayan 2002; Baber 2007, 126 and insofar as adaptive preferences are defined in relationship to her list) the deprivation involved is always unjust.
As I will argue later, the treatment she gives of the concept of adaptive preference is not consistent with such a justification. This inconsistency can be 9 Note that this is a point about how one values a capability, not about whether she chooses a functioning. Even on a fully perfectionist account of capabilities, the person who chooses to fast for religious reasons need not have an adaptive preference, since she may value both the capability for religious observance and the capability to be adequately nourished -she may merely be choosing between incompatible functionings in a particular instance. I thank an editor of this journal for pushing me to clarify this point. ' (2005, 319) . This is because of the important function that he attaches to self-respect: it gives us, he says, 'a firm conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worth carrying out' (Ibid., 318).
Self-respect, on Rawls's account, has much in common with the idea of secondary recognition respect that I have been using. Just as expressing secondary recognition respect requires recognizing the interest that persons have in being seen as trusted authorities on their own good, a society that wants to ensure justice must facilitate the possibility that citizens can believe that their own determinate conceptions of the good are worth carrying out. And this connection between the two ideas should make it clear why state perfectionism cannot express secondary recognition respect for citizens: perfectionism, having settled on a true account of human good, denies the truth of accounts that disagree -and without the possibility of seeing one's own determinate account of the good as true, it is very difficult to see it as worth carrying out. Similarly, without the possibility of seeing oneself as an authority on one's own good, it is hard to trust oneself to effectively direct the course of one's own life, or to engage in political discussions about the course of a shared political life.
One might object that a perfectionist state could take steps to avoid such problematic claims about citizens. Perhaps, for instance, it could hold that a person is wrong about the good in a particular instance without holding that she must be wrong in every situation. After all, we must all make some errors in moral reasoning; it would be hubris to think otherwise. But such a response will be of little consolation to the person whose area of 'error' is itself central to her conception of the good and the course that she wants her life to take. Rawls modifies justice as fairness by making it into a decidedly political form of liberalism. For him, this means that the liberal commitments that it makes apply only to a certain area of life: to the basic structure of a society, which includes its main political, social, and economic institutions (Rawls 2005, 11-13 in which she states that hers is a 'specifically political theory that is only partially comprehensive' (1998, 284, emphasis added) . Similarly, even in later work, she continues to tie the conception of human dignity that grounds the capabilities approach to 'certain ways of life' that are 'fully human' (Nussbaum 2011a, 78) . Here, it is much more difficult to understand the capabilities as those things that citizens must be required to value for themselves and their fellows in the political realm. 
Perfectionism and internal capability
If there is ambiguity as to which of the two options Nussbaum intends -that capabilities be seen as things owed politically to citizens, or as things that citizens are meant to see as the most basic elements of a good human life -the way in which she conceptualizes capability should encourage us towards the latter view. Nussbaum states in no uncertain terms that the capabilities on the list must not be understood in a 'purely formal manner ' (2000b, 86) . A person who formally has the right to an education does not have the capability to actually be educated if she lives so far from the nearest school that she cannot reach it, or if she cannot afford the required uniform, or if her teachers rarely show up to teach. Instead, meaningfully having a capability requires having access to the material conditions that make the associated functioning a real possibility.
But according to Nussbaum, we should not think of capability only in terms of external resources. On her account, capability should be separated into three parts:
basic capability, internal capability, and combined capability (Ibid. 84). A basic capability is the latent internal capacity that can be developed into a capability. For instance, nearly all human beings are born with the capability to develop language, 16 Recall again that I am concerned here only with truth claims. The state might make some action, such as recreational drug use, illegal on the grounds that it tends to lead to harm, without denying that it might have any moral value. Of course, as the interest involved becomes more fundamental, as it might in the case of dangerous initiation rites, the situation becomes more complicated, and space constraints unfortunately prevent me from discussing the most complicated cases here. has not learned to read lacks an internal capability, a child who has been taught does not necessarily have the full capability. Full capability is combined capability: that is, an internal capability in conjunction with the external resources to exercise the associated functioning. A person who is literate may have the ability to read, but she does not have the capability to do so unless she has access to books.
In introducing this tripartite distinction, Nussbaum herself uses the example of literacy, and its qualities make it a neat tool for spelling out the differences between the three elements. Jointly, these conditions do seem to accurately capture whether a person is able to do the thing that she has reason to value (in this case, read). And together, they also seem to give us a good sense of the point at which a person can choose not to exercise a capability: in order to meaningfully have the capability to read, a person must at minimum be literate, have access to books, and have the time to read them. Without any one of these components, the "choice" not to exercise her capability seems to be, in an important sense, a false one.
But the example of reading seems to me to be too neat, because it obscures in less neat cases what it is that having a capability requires. ' (2000b, 31) . So it seems right that internal capability should, for Nussbaum, include not just technical skills like the ability to recognize letters and string them together into words, but also the space to value: the ability to see an option as something to be hoped for, something to be loved, something the loss of which is to be feared.
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But thinking about capability in this way brings Nussbaum back towards her perfectionist account of basic human good. If having a capability is meant to be a prerequisite for meaningfully deciding not to exercise a functioning, and if actually having a capability seems to require appreciating the value of the thing in question, then in order to meaningfully decide not to engage in some functioning on the list, we end up having to say once again that an individual must endorse the value of all of the goods on the list.
Perfectionist adaptive preferences
Let us return to the account of adaptive preferences that Nussbaum might give. Although this definition is not explicitly offered in Nussbaum's work, I take it to be immanent in much of what she says on the subject. In preface to her discussion of adaptive preferences, Nussbaum notes that 17 Indeed, internal capability might even effect a person's combined capability to read if she has learned to do so but fails to see the activity as in any way valuable -which it might be rational to do if, as in the classic case of adaptive preference, she takes reading to have no value as a result of the inaccessibility of reading materials. 18 I return below to the question of whether an adaptive preference must still be a function of deprivation or a matter of injustice.
Where there is lifelong deprivation, the distinction [between internal and combined capabilities] is not so easy to draw: persistent deprivation affects the internal readiness to function. A child raised in an environment without freedom of speech or religion does not develop the same political and religious capabilities as a child who is raised in a nation that protects these liberties (2000b, 85) .
This passage suggests that it is indeed internal capability that is at stake in instances where adaptive preferences exist. And later in her discussion, Nussbaum recommends that in cases where people do not exercise capabilities that they seem to possess, we should refrain from actually attributing capabilities to them until we have determined whether 'persistent inequalities or hierarchies may have created emotional barriers to full participation ' (2000b, 93, emphasis added) . Although she does not use the term 'adaptive preference' here, the implication seems to be that persons who are not emotionally able to exercise a capability lack that capability as surely as those who lack the external resources to do so. And although there may be several kinds of emotional barriers to the exercise of a capability, a failure to appropriately value the capability seems to capture what Nussbaum has in mind in her intuitive examples of a woman failing to protest her husband beating her, or quietly accepting the lower-paid work in the brick kiln, or girls thinking that education is owed only to their brothers.
In each of these cases, there may or may not be a complete failure to value the capability in question -the woman might, for instance, simply be unable to imagine a life without abuse, rather than thinking that there is nothing wrong with the status quo.
But even if her failure is only one of imagination, it still seems to prevent her from appropriately valuing the corresponding capability to be free from assault: given its immense value, it should be seen to have fundamental importance, not to be something whose absence can be tolerated if it is not convenient. The idea of adaptive preferences is valuable precisely because it is motivated by the importance of the individual's freedom to live according to the values that matter to her. Development ethicists, feminists, and others concerned with social justice are ready to consider the possibility that some preferences might be adaptive because they recognize that there are certain sets of circumstances, especially likely to be encountered by victims of injustice, that can prevent people from valuing the sorts of things that they would be likely to value in nearly any other set of circumstances.
But if persons do continue to value the same things after much thought and in these various situations, then taking seriously the freedom of individuals to live according to their own set of values should require us to see these preferences as no longer 20 Recall that in some cases, a person may see an option as valuable without preferring it. This is obvious in cases of trade-offs between goods, such as the example offered by Nussbaum of the person who chooses to fast for religious reasons, trading the good of being well-nourished for the good of spiritual gain. But the cases that provide the greatest problems for secondary recognition respect are not of this sort: they are the cases in which persons, rather than making trade-offs between goods, simply deny that one 'good' is a good at all.
adaptive. Defining adaptive preferences entirely in terms of perfectionist content denies this freedom to all persons who disagree with the list. But defining adaptive preferences in terms of both perfectionist content and unjust deprivation-based genesis is no better. Indeed, it only adds insult to injury for those whose deprivationbased preferences are held hostage by their adaptive status. While they, who have already suffered so much injustice and deprivation, will never have their states recognize them as authorities on their own good in areas about which they feel strongly, those who have already benefited from privileged circumstances will be seen as authorities on preferences with exactly the same content.
In the end, an account of adaptive preferences should alert us to situations in which persons may not have the space to reimagine their preferences, in order that such space might be made -and Nussbaum's broader political-liberal account of the capabilities approach is valuable precisely for its ability to do this. But an account of adaptive preferences should not categorize preferences as necessarily adaptive based on their content alone, nor should it encourage us to categorize them as very persistently adaptive in situations where this space has come into existence and preferences have been interrogated and maintained -and Nussbaum's perfectionist account of adaptive preferences, unfortunately, continues to do this. Refusing to do this, is, at its heart, what showing secondary recognition respect requires. And in both theory and practice, this must be one of the chief goals of work on the concept of adaptive preference.
Conclusion
While I have focused in this paper on clarifying and identifying the problems with Nussbaum's own account of adaptive preferences, I take this critique to be useful primarily insofar as it clears the way for development of a positive, non-perfectionist account of the concept. Offering such an account is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but I want to close with at least a few gestures in that direction.
Think again of intuitive examples of adaptive preferences. Such examples might be unified in many ways: by the failure to want the treatment that human beings have a right to expect, by a dearth of human dignity, by endorsement of inequality, or by a toleration of persistently unmet needs, to name a few. Each of these is certainly a plausible and morally problematic unifying characteristic -but notice that each of them replicates the problem addressed in this paper. Relying on any one of these concepts will require giving a positive specification of a concept taken to have intrinsic value, and such specifications will also run the risk of treating disrespectfully those persons who disagree with them.
More promising, I think, is a reliance on this unifying characteristic: all of those preferences are ones that persons themselves would be expected to be highly unlikely to want to have were they to reflect on their own preferences in a considered way and in better circumstances. This unifying characteristic allows us to blame the badness of adaptive preferences on failures of circumstances to provide the instrumentally valuable opportunities that allow individuals the freedom to determine what they do in fact want, rather than on failures of persons to want things that accord with some intrinsic value. In this case, all of the other possible unifying characteristics -human flourishing, dignity, basic needs, and equality -could be used to formulate working lists, similar to Nussbaum's, that 
